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INTRODUCTION
During the past ten years, environmental issues have
steadily emerged as important considerations in the
planning and implementation of major projects by the
public or governmental and private sectors of the
population of industrial countries. This development
has presented, to those concerned with environmental
conservation, an unprecedented set of opportunities
to influence important decisions. It has also confronted
them with enormous challenges to determine how these
environmental considerations can be incorporated
into decision-making processes in a manner that will be
.consistent with the expectations, capabilities, and
responsibilities, of a wide variety of decision-makers
and the people whom they represent.
These opportunities and challenges have been
strdngly felt in the United States as a result of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (U.S.
Council on Environmental Quality, 1970) which requir-
ed all Federal agencies to prepare a statement of the
environmental impacts of their major proposed activi-
ties. Public and private organizations in other coun-
tries are subject to varying degrees of legislative or
public pressure to examine the probable effects on the
environment of their activities, before proceeding to
implement any major plans.
As a result of these developments, much work has
been done to determine how the analysis of what are
commonly called 'environmental impacts' can be
undertaken systematically. The following references
are indicative of the diverse nature of these efforts:
Quade (1970), Leopold et al. (1971), Whitman et al.
(1971), Bagley (1972), Baumgold & Enk (1972),
Bishop (1972), Ditton & Goodale (1972), Kneese &
Bower (1972), Stover (1972), Daetz & Schlesinger
(1973), Sorenson & Moss (1973), and U.S. Council on
Environmental Quality (1973).
One of the most persistent and bothersome dif-
ficulties in efforts to develop techniques or methodolo-
gies for environmental impact analysis has been the
need to differentiate, and make explicit, the objective
and the subjective jugdements that are required. In
some of the earlier attempts it was implicitly assumed
that such an analysis could be undertaken by employing
purely objective data, scientific judgements, and
evident conclusions, and that it would not be necessary
for the analyst to introduce any value-judgements—a
role reserved for the 'decision-maker'. In some of the
more recent efforts, the subjective nature of the
analysis is explicitly recognized, but it is often assumed
that the analyst can somehow make these subjective
judgements in an 'objective' manner—thus eliminating
the need to face the issues involved in introducing
various types of values into the analysis.
The present paper is based on the premise that the
analysis of environmental impacts requires both objec-
tive and subjective judgements at almost every stage, and
that if these two types of judgements are confused in the
mind of the analyst, or in his final product, then the
effectiveness—and even the credibility—of his work
will be seriously compromised. In order to aid the
analyst in these distinctions, the present paper will
discuss the types of objective and subjective judge-
ments that must be made at each of the steps taken in
arriving at the final analysis.
For the purposes of this paper, objective judgements
are those which involve or use facts that are observable
or verifiable—especially by scientific methods—and
which do not depend on personal reflections, feelings,
or prejudices. This does not suggest that know-
ledgeable persons will always make the same objective
judgements. There is much disagreement among
scientists and other scholars on important points of
theory and interpretation of verifiable data. Thus
objective judgements may indeed be different and still
be objective. In these cases, however, there is a danger
of subjective considerations slipping in—as will be
discussed later.
On the other hand, subjective judgements are those
which are made on the basis of values, feelings, and
beliefs. They generally vary widely from person to
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person, group to group, institution to institution, and
society to society. Subjective judgements can be
changed, but this requires a change in the underlying
values of the party that is making the judgement;
objective judgements, conversely, can be changed by
the simple introduction of new objective data or
acceptable interpretations. With respect to environ-
mental impacts, the objective judgement describes the
impact (for example, the number of fish that would be
killed under certain circumstances) whereas subjective
judgements are made with respect to how people feel
about that 'fact' (for example, one citizen may not
care at all while another, who enjoys fishing, may be
extremely upset).
ANALYZING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
Before discussing the steps to be taken in environ-
mental impact analysis, it is useful to consider the
fundamental cause of environmental problems. It is
essential to realize that the disruption of the environ-
ment is not a goal or an end of any specific activity.
It is rather the by-product of activities or the means
through which they are conducted. These activities
have in general been initiated to fulfill very important
food, shelter, security, and other physical or emotional
needs, in the process of filling these needs (and wants),
Man in his inventiveness has determined how to use
and manipulate his environment. Sometimes he has
used environmental resources directly (such as wood
or oil) and sometimes he has used them indirectly
(such as for a free disposal system).
Recently, societies have begun recognizing that part
of the costs which they are paying for those goods and
services that they 'need' involve the loss of some
environmental resources. This has created a conflict.
It is a conflict between the desirability of continuing to
obtain what they 'need' or the way they obtain it
versus the desirability of not despoiling, degrading, or
destroying, finite environmental resources. It is not a
choice of giving up something 'bad', such as polluting
or a technology; it is a choice of giving up or of
paying more for a commodity or service that they had
previously decided they wanted and that someone has
undertaken to provide for them.
Thus in the overall context there are no pure
'villains'. There are, however, people and organiza-
tions who meet other persons' needs while at the same
time depriving them (or others) of other things that
they also value. Resolution of these conflicts will
involve change, and can thus deeply affect the legiti-
mate interests of some segments of the society who
now find some of the consequences of their socially
desirable activities on a new list of undesirable costs.
This is the great dilemma of resolving conflicts in
environmental management. If a society decides that
pollution of a certain river is undesirable, it cannot
simply close the polluting plant, for the plant's
business is not to pollute but to create products that
people want to buy and jobs for people who need to
work. If a society decides that it is using too many
trees, it cannot simply force lumber companies to
stop cutting trees, as their business is not to kill trees
but to provide wood and paper products for an enor-
mous number of activities throughout the entire
society.
Analyses of environmental impacts are undertaken
to supply, in a systematic way, the information that
societies need to resolve these conflicts. As the conflicts
are the result of clashing values, the analyses must
somehow address and incorporate these values; other-
wise they will prove to be largely irrelevant—even
though they may be replete with facts, figures, and imagi-
native theories of cause-effect relationships. However,
when they do include the value judgements, these must
be incorporated in a very explicit and careful manner or
the analysis itself will become an issue of conflict rather
than a means of resolving a larger conflict.
Finding the balance between these extremes presents
a great challenge to the environmental analyst, co-
ordinator, and manager. An environmental impact
analysis—which must include some statement, defini-
tion, and delineation, of specific environmental
'problems'—represents by its very nature the products
 :
of numerous scientific, social, and political, decisions.
Without understanding the types and mixes of deci-
sions and the order in which they are taken, the
analyst, and the decision-maker who uses his work,
may feel that they are proceeding on the basis of firm,
objective scientific analysis when in reality the implicit
value-judgements have been paramount in setting the
constraints within which the problem can be analyzed.
In an effort to help scientists and analysts to avoid
this outcome, this paper will discuss some of the
objective and subjective judgements that must be
made in the following major steps of predicting,
analyzing, and judging, environmental impacts:
Identifying Major Activities
Selecting Environmental Components
Selecting Types of Impacts
Assessing the Possibilities and/or Probabilities of
Occurrences
Determining the Degree of the Impacts
Determining the Time-frame of Impacts
Designating Impacts as Positive, Neutral, or
Negative
Determining Trade-offs among Activities and
Impacts.
Although these steps can only be discussed one-at-a-
time and in a linear manner, this does not suggest that
they can be undertaken in such a straightforward
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way as this. Environmental impact analysis is a highly
iterative process. Each new group of data or piece of
information quite often suggests the inclusion of
related information or values in various steps of the
process; consequently, parts of the analysis must be
redone, and only rarely can definitive conclusions be
reached in one step without some inputs from other
steps.
Identifying Major Activities
The discussion in the rest of this paper will expand
upon the following relationships:
Activities and/or their By-products —*- Impact on
Environmental Components.
Many activities (such as strip-mining) impact upon
some environmental components directly (such as coal
depletion and land destruction) and upon other com-
ponents indirectly through their by-products (such as
aquatic biota through water pollution from erosion, or
human health through air pollution from the mining
operations). In general, the analyst must catalogue
the major activities and by-products which would
result from a project that is proposed or that is
already resulting in environmental problems. This
requires an extensive analysis of the various phases of
the project—construction, operation, expansion, main-
tenance, and ultimate disposition. It also requires
examination of the inputs and outputs of the processes
involved. To determine the environmental impact of
products, the production, use, and disposal, phases and
processes must each be studied. The potential of
accidents should also be considered.
These lists of activities and their by-products are
objective in nature. They are straightforward listings
of functions, products, effluents, and so on, that any
group of skilled technical persons would compile in
roughly the same manner as any other equally skilled
group. There is no problem with objectivity as long as
one is thorough and comprehensive. However, in a
project of any serious complexity, one cannot be
comprehensive—or the listing of activities and their
by-products would be so prohibitively long that there
would be too little time or too few resources to analyze
the impacts resulting from them.
Judgements must be applied to narrow the list—and
while they may appear to be objective, they are usually
based on a set of subjective judgements. For example,
a construction engineer may assert that the bulldozing
operation at a new plant-site has no adverse effect on
the environment—apart from the land already set
aside—and may thus leave that activity off the list of
possibly harmful items. This may be the result of a
careful and objective determination of the lack of
effects of the bulldozing on parts of the environment
that are of 'importance'—such as through noise pollu-
tion—even though the effects on 'unimportant'
components of the environment, such as the ant colo-
nies that would be destroyed, might be significant.
This example demonstrates both the subjective
nature of this step of analysis and also the iterative and
interconnected nature of the entire analysis process.
Without some criteria for 'important' and 'unimpor-
tant' impacts on environmental components, there is
no way that the list of activities and by-products can
be reduced by a single item. These criteria are subjec-
tive in nature, and they are derived from other steps in
the analysis process which will be discussed below.
If the other steps are not made first, the listing of
activities becomes an endless and senseless chore. But
if the activities are not listed first, then how can
impacts be identified and analyzed?
This difficulty is usually resolved in two ways: first,
by a combination of working on many of the steps
simultaneously and of selectively working through a
series of steps for a single activity, impact, or environ-
mental component; and secondly, by utilizing the
subjective judgements that have explicitly or impli-
citly been made on similar activities (for example,
during a recent plant construction local citizens may
have picketed because the bulldozers disturbed their
children's sleeping whereas no one even mentioned all
the ant colonies that were destroyed). Using the first
of these approaches introduces all of the subjectivity
of other steps into this ostensibly objective listing of
activities. The second approach may result in the
subtle and implicit introduction of subjectivity without
the benefit of making it explicit in the other steps. It is
especially important to be aware of this latter possibil-
ity.
When the 'major' activities and their by-products
have been identified, the earlier relationship can be
represented as follows: S (Activities)i + 2 (By-
m o
products); —»- Impacts on Environmental Compo-
nents, where SB denotes the summation of 'a' items
a c
of 'B', the V being a general notation for any item 'B' ;
—> denotes 'results in': this general definition will
apply to equations throughout the paper.
Selecting Environmental Components
The selection of those components of the environ-
ment that will be considered in the impact analysis is
critical. These choices will determine the boundaries
of concern about an activity and thus to a large degree
determine the very nature of the problems and any
potential solutions. There is essentially an infinite list
of objectively determinable environmental com-
ponents and ways of defining relationships among
them. Once again, the thoroughly objective analyst
will have a never-ending task of listing the components
that could be considered in the analysis. Subjective
judgements must be introduced in such a manner that
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only 'important' components and relationships are
singled out for detailed analysis. The decision must
also be made on how 'environment' is to be defined:
for example, whether it will include social as well as
natural components and relationships.
The concept of 'importance' implies a set of value-
judgements that must be made relative to something,
and that are made by a person or group holding those
values. Whose values are to be used in setting these
criteria for selection—the local conservation group, the
multinational corporation, the tourist industry, the
government, or some other interested or disinterested
parties? The list of 'important' components will vary
from group to group, and the reasons for listing the
same components may also vary (thus a species of fish
may be listed by commercial fishermen and by conser-
vationists for widely opposing reasons).
The analyst must somehow decide whose values he
will accept for purposes of deciding which environ-
mental components to consider, and whose he will
reject. He should explicitly specify whatever criteria he
chooses in making these critical choices—whether they
are based on social, political, or ecological, grounds or
on his own personal or institutional biases. When once
this has been done, his analysis is no longer an 'objec-
tive analysis' but an analysis in which objective deter-
minations are made within the context of subjectively-
chosen parameters. Thus even one of the most
'scientific' of all the steps—selecting environmental
components—is ultimately based more on values than
on science, if one is to have a manageable list for
analysis. When once these selections have been made,
the earlier relationship becomes the following:
2 (Activities)i + S (By-products),- —>- Impacts on
m n
S (Environmental Components)].
P
Selecting Types of Impacts
For any given component of the environment that
is affected by some activity or by-product, there are a
wide variety of types of impacts that could be con-
sidered. For example, if a certain species of plant or
animal is affected, then is the impact listed only if the
species is eradicated, or if its numbers are reduced
below a certain level (what level?), or if its general
health or well-being is affected (how much?), or if the
impact on the species creates another set of impacts on
other species or on biological, geological, chemical, or
social, processes—and so on?
The identification of the types of impacts—such as
extinction, mortality, morbidity, and instability—for
any component, is an objective process. But here again
the analyst is overwhelmed with the theoretical length
of such a list, as was the case in the previous steps. In
addition there is a new and profound difficulty—the
state of scientific understanding is very poor with
respect to the types of impacts that are possible, and to
their ramifications on related parts of the environment.
This situation has not improved at all markedly since
a group of prestigious scientists on the National
Science Board (1971) reported the following to the
President of the United States as their 'principal
conclusion':
'Environmental science, today, is unable to match the
needs of society for definitive information, predictive
capability, and the analysis of environmental systems as
systems. Because existing data and current theoretical
models are inadequate, environmental science remains
unable in virtually all areas of application to offer more
than qualitative interpretations or suggestions of environ-
mental change that may occur in response to specific
actions.'
The necessity of reducing the list of impacts to those
of 'importance', coupled with the limitations of the
scientific community to provide guidance on the impli-
cations of many impacts, forces the analyst to make
innumerable subjective judgements. When objective
facts are lacking, he must rely on the only things
available—values, feelings, beliefs, and prejudices. It
is useless to debate whether he should do this, for he has
no choice if he is to proceed with what information
he does have and make decisions on how to allocate
resources to supplement his information in carefully
selected areas. There is, however, an important
question of whose values and biases he adopts for
purposes of this selection process, and how explicit he
is about these choices in his report. The issue is not
whether he makes subjective judgements but the
degree to which he recognizes when he is doing it, his
basis for doing it, and his responsibility to make these
explicit in his analysis.
The principal subjective judgements that must be
made are with respect to the following: What types of
damage or enhancement of each specific environmental
component will be noted (for example, the spectrum
from extinction to inconvenience, or from irreversible
process to self-correcting perturbation); how much
damage or enhancement to each specific component
will be considered 'important' enough to require a full
analysis (for example, the extinction of tunas versus
Peregrine Falcons, or the general reduction in health of
a city versus that of a seal colony, or a few per cent
yearly change in local precipitation versus a few
degrees steady-state change in global temperature);
and finally, and very profoundly, what types of second-,
third-, and fourth-order effects of the primary impact
will be considered and how much creative energy will
be devoted to identifying these. The following example
illustrates this last point: one activity of a new plant
in a community might be to create new jobs which
could have a 'primary' impact of changing the material
standard of living in the community; this might then
result in a change in the dominant life-styles, which in
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turn could result in an influx of different types of
people, thus creating changes in ethnic and religious
groupings which could then begin changes in the
cultural fabric of the community—and so on.
The compilation and analysis of the objective data
that exist on impacts, and the application of the types
of subjective judgements discussed above, combine
with the previous steps to produce the following
relationship:
S (Activities)i + S (By-products)j —v 2 (Impacts)k
n m o
S (Environmental Components):
p
This relationship is useful in illustrating how
complex the analysis is, especially if the summation
totals—n, m, o, and p—are very large. The only way
that they can be kept small is by making numerous
subjective judgements, using such criteria as 'major' or
'important'. If an analysis that is not absolutely
comprehensive in its coverage of a complex environ-
mental 'problem' claims to be objective, then it is
probably either being misrepresented wilfully or
unknowingly or else the analyst is so in tune with the
values, mores, and preferences, of the recipients of the
analysis, that both writer and reader share and
accept the same implicit subjective constraints on what
is to be analyzed objectively. Such a state of harmony
is rare among concerned parties who scrutinize analyses
of most environmental issues.
• The relationship given above is not meant to be
mathematically representative of how one would list the
categories for analysis. Instead of a long list of factors
summed together, there would be a series of relation-
ships. A certain activity might impact in five specific
ways on a certain environmental component, in three
ways on another, and so on. Alternatively, the analysis
could proceed by noting that a certain environmental
component is impacted upon in four ways by a
specific activity, in five ways by a specific by-product,
in two ways by the third-order effect of another
activity, and so on. The relationship thus describes a
multitude of cases which must each be analyzed
further in the steps to be discussed. The simplest case is
represented in the following way:
(Activity)A —*~ (Impact^ on (Environmental
Component^
(Activity)A ->• (Effect)Bc
where for purposes of this paper (Effect) BC is the
result of (Impact)B on (Environmental Component)c.
Assessing the Possibilities and/or Probabilities of
Occurrences
To a large degree, the previous steps have produced
hypothetical listings of potential cause-effect relation-
ships between activities and environmental com-
ponents. It is now necessary to determine the possibil-
ity and/or probability that any given effect—a specific
impact on a specific environmental component—will
indeed occur as a result of the proposed project or
activity, or from an accident. The effect may either be
certain or it may be uncertain within some probability
range. If it is uncertain it should be referred to as a
'risk' rather than an 'effect'.
In 'risk' analysis and probability assessment, the
state of scientific knowledge is such that it is generally
impossible to obtain a specific probability such as 0.2
or 0.8. Often it is only possible to speak about 'likely'
and 'unlikely'. The analyst must be very clear as to
what he means by this: for example, greater than 0.75
or less than 0.25. The modifications of such ambiguous
phrases are endless: for example, 'highly likely',
'very unlikely', almost certain', 'negligibly small', and
so on. The interpretation of such phrases will vary
from person to person and context to context (how
small a risk is 'neglibly small' if its occurrence were
to obliterate 100,000 persons?). Clearly such terms
contain subjective judgements.
In principle, the determination of whether an activity
will have an 'effect' (with certainty) or present a
'risk' (with some probability) could be purely objective
if the level of scientific knowledge were adequate to
support these conclusions. As noted earlier, this is not
often the case; yet many judgements have to be made.
These are often regarded as 'professional' judgements,
and there can be much disagreement among scientists
and professionals without any introduction of the type
of subjective judgements that this paper has been
discussing. However, when the objective grounds for
judgements are very limited and speculation begins
to replace supportable theoretical conjecture, it is
possible for subjectivity to creep in—often without the
analyst realizing it. In general, the definitive conclusion
of 'certainty' would be wholly objective only with the
full consensus of all knowledgeable parties. 'Risk'
assessments, on the other hand, are very susceptible
to the introduction of subjectivity.
Whether one is liberal or conservative in assessing
possibilities and probabilities is often a function of
personal, professional, and institutional, biases and
these are often used by scientists and analysts to sup-
plement scientific intuition—particularly with respect
to 'safety factors'. Something may, on the basis of
the best available data, seem slightly 'unlikely'; but
if the person making the judgement feels, perhaps at
an unconscious level, that the component or the effect
is so 'important' that it is better to be safe than sorry,
he may conclude in good professional conscience that
it is really slightly 'likely' for purposes of the analysis.
In areas where there are very few experimental data and
the theories are often little more than sophisticated
speculation, the emphasis put on the 'doomsday'
theories or the 'things-will-work-themselves-out' theo-
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ries can vary according to individual and professional
tastes.
Unfortunately, such lack of empirical or firm theo-
retical grounding often occurs in the environmental
sciences—particularly in those dealing with key inter-
relationships such as epidemiology, ecology, atmo-
spheric sciences, and oceanography. Thus the analyst
must not only be on guard for sloppy scientific judge-
ments, but, even in this apparently objective area of
probability assessment, he must also be aware of
potential value-biases in the conclusions.
When the determinations discussed in this section
are made, the previous relationship can be elaborated
as follows:
(if certain) (Effect) BC
(Activity) A — !— 'likely'
(if not certain) (Risk) BC
• '— 'unlikely'
Determining the Degree of Impacts
The analysis of the change that occurs in an environ-
mental component as a result of a present or predicted
impact, is a really objective process as long as the scien-
tific base on which conclusions are made is strong. The
same difficulties that were discussed in the previous
section may arise, however, and may have the same
consequences with respect to subjective judgements that
are being implicitly introduced.
Such subjective judgements are very different from
those which were discussed in the section on selecting
types of impacts—what types, how much, and what
level, of impacts are to be considered. However, any
objective judgements that may be made about the
degree of an impact are arrived at within the value
context set by the selection of type. This is a very
important point for the scientist and analyst to recog-
nize : when once the stage is reached of determining,
qualitatively and quantitatively, the amounts of
changes that occur for a specific effect, the 'problem'
has already been almost totally defined by parameters
of a subjective nature. If the analyst limits himself
solely to the assessment of degree, then he can usually
manage to maintain credibility as an 'expert'. How-
ever, if he presents results of his analysis that include
other steps discussed here, his 'expertness' will be
compromised by his or others' values.
It was noted earlier that these steps can be taken in
many orders and sequences; but this step of determin-
ing the degree of an impact is often the first one taken
towards pointing out the need for conducting or
expanding an analysis, and through it scientists have
made many important contributions to environmental
management and conservation. For example, the
scientific predictions on the degree of impact of SSTs
on stratospheric composition and the resulting impacts
on health and climatic processes, played a large part in
the debates that ended in the decision not to build
SSTs in the United States. Scientific assessments of
degrees of impact which might result from changes in
environmental processes without relating the causes
of the changes to any particular activities, can stimu-
late society to be aware of undesirable possibilities and
make it more attentive to activities that might have
such effects; for example, a prediction that a reduction
of the ozone layer in the stratosphere could result in
increased incidences of skin cancer has already
brought such diverse activities as SST transport and
aerosol deodorant use under close scrutiny.
Determining the Time-frame of Impacts
Another important dimension in assessing environ-
mental impacts is the time-scale in which an effect will
or might occur. Sometimes this determination is
relatively straightforward and is thus based primarily
on objective judgements; an example is the time it
would take, under certain conditions, for the antarctic
ice-cap to melt (it should be noted that the estimate
may be incorrect but is now widely agreed upon in the
scientific community). In other cases the determination
of the time-frame may be nebulous at best—for
example, the length of time it would take for eradica-
tion of the Black-footed Ferret to affect the stability
and/or diversity of an ecosystem, and the time it would,
take the ecosystem to reach a new state of equilibrium.
In such cases, the types of subjective judgements
discussed in the section on probabilities may begin to
occur in the scientific analyses.
The time-frame is very important in political
decision-making (the motivation for the analysis),
especially if an undesirable impact is likely to occur
within a few years—the normal time-horizon of the
politician or high-level administrator. In most socie-
ties at present the major emphasis appears to be on
reducing short-term adverse effects and either ignoring
long-term effects or hoping that a way will be found
in time to avoid them. A word often used to describe
the short-term possibilities is 'imminent'. The opera-
tional definitions of imminent, and of its opposite, are
highly subjective in nature. Whether these labels are
used to denote two days, two weeks, two years, two
decades, or two generations, is a subjective decision
and will reflect the values of the labeller.
There are also uncertainties in determining if an
adverse effect or risk will be imminent if a given
activity occurs. These judgements are primarily
objective, but once again subjective conservatism or
liberalism can enter—usually implicitly. Although it
becomes rather cumbersome to do so, it is often necess-
ary to qualify the judgement of imminence with a
'likely' or 'unlikely' that reflects the lack of a strong
scientific basis. Thus one may have to talk about a
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'likely imminent unlikely risk', or use some similarly
jumbled phrase.
Decision about the time-frame can also be influenced
by such factors as irreversibility and non-renewability.
These can be determined objectively, but how they will
be viewed will depend on subjective judgements.
Designating Impacts as Positive, Neutral, or Negative
While the determination of degree of impact is
almost purely objective, the designation of those
impacts as positive (beneficial), neutral, or negative
(adverse), is purely subjective. The following expe-
rience, related by the former head of the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (Ruckelshaus, 1974), makes
this general point very graphically:
'In June of 1972 I was administrator of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and in that capacity
was a delegate to the first world-wide conference on the
environment in Stockholm, Sweden. While there I hosted
a luncheon for all the African delegations south of the
Sahara. For four hours all of us present discussed the
environment as a global issue. Before that luncheon
I knew intellectually that the less-developed countries of
the world viewed the environment differently than we did.
Afterward I understood the difference viscerally...
I was trying to convince them that they needn't repeat
our mistakes in the process of meeting the legitimate
material aspirations of their people. I shall never forget
how during my plea the minister of the environment from
Ghana jumped to his feet and shook his finger at me,
, saying "You just don't understand. Let me give you an
;
 example of how my people view the environment. If
you discovered a widely-used pesticide was killing fish,
your people would demand that you ban it. In Ghana
my people would use it—to kill fish—and then eat them.
That a pesticide had such lethal capacity would be
good news to them." Obviously, the problems of
protecting the environment in Ghana were not the same
as in America.'
Determining Trade-offs among Activities and Impacts
The 'final' step in an environmental impact analysis
is to relate the impacts, and all the associated judge-
ments about them, to the activities that cause interested
people to explore the implications of accepting the
impacts or of modifying or ceasing the causal activities.
This is often referred to as performing a 'cost/benefit
[C/B] analysis'. Such an analysis is really made up of
numerous individual C/B analyses of a variety of
factors such as the narrow economic C/B of an
activity, the specific ecological C/B of a specific
impact on a specific component of the environment,
and the political C/B of controlling an activity in a
certain manner.
The objective of the C/B analysis is to provide
information that will ultimately be used in making two
classes of basic environmental management decisions:
those on 'acceptability' or 'unacceptability' of adverse
effects, and those on modifications, alternatives, or
controls, that would ensure that the 'costs' do not
exceed the 'benefits' of any given activity. The
relationship among the steps discussed in this part of
the paper with these two social and political decision-
making processes is shown schematically in Fig. 1. It
FIG. 1. Relationships among steps in environmental impact
analysis and social and political decision-making processes.
can readily be seen that this is a very complex, dyna-
mic process in which all the judgements are dependent
on one another. The decision on 'acceptability' of
adverse effects cannot be made without criteria, and
these criteria are dependent on how the overall C/B of
a given activity is perceived; for example, the loss of a
'beneficial' predator, due to a pesticide use that
eliminates a pest, may be acceptable if the vegetation
to be saved is of cotton but not if it is of petunias. On
the other hand, one cannot determine that the C/B
ratio for cotton crops will always be less than one,
regardless of what types of adverse effects might have
to be tolerated. Thus, the 'environmental costs' that a
society is willing to accept are dependent on their
relation to the total C/B of the activity, which is
itself made up in part by the 'environmental costs'.
This presents the classic problem encountered in
interconnected systems, of needing to have a piece of
information from B to determine A—but realizing that
the required information can only be derived from A!
The only approach that works is an iterative one; but
this requires some assumptions, in the C/B analyses,
about how 'society' will judge the acceptability of
adverse effects and the desirability of modifications,
alternatives, or controls. This places the analyst
squarely within the province of the proverbial 'deci-
sion-maker', and he must be very careful not to
arrogate the authority that the decision-maker has to
articulate and set priorities among conflicting values.
The best safeguard is for the analyst to provide a
scrupulously explicit account of the value-assumptions
made, and to express these value-assumptions in
terms such as 'If this effect is judged unacceptable
because of the following reasons. . . , then the costs
appear to outweigh the benefits if the only benefits
considered are the following.... On the other hand, if
the following additional benefits are considered...,
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and the reasons for unacceptability do not include the
following reasons.. . , then the benefits would out-
weigh the costs.' Clearly such elaborations cannot be
developed endlessly. Thus, in the absence of instant
feedback from society or its decision-makers on every
new point in the analysis as it arises, the analyst must
introduce the most fundamental subjective judgements
of all—the very acceptability of adverse impacts and of
efforts taken to reduce them.
To complicate the picture further, it is not possible to
assess ultimately an overall C/B relationship and
determine acceptability of an activity (and its effects)
without considering the effects and C/B of any controls,
modifications, or alternatives (in the rest of this
section these three will be referred to as controls), that
might be instituted to mitigate potential 'environ-
mental costs'. These controls will introduce other C/Bs,
directly or indirectly, by modifying all of the previous
analyses—any control option will set up a new situa-
tion requiring one to examine new components, new
impacts, new probabilities, and so on, as well as to
determine the new costs and benefits at every stage
(including the newly-added control). The final layer
of complexity is a very familiar and frustrating pro-
blem : virtually all of the individual C/B analyses con-
tain judgements that are not quantifiable, and are not
even comparable with one another, so that comparison
of a C/B analysis on one aspect (such as health) with
another aspect (such as economics) is almost always
intractable. This is popularly called 'mixing apples and
oranges to make decisions about grapefruit'.
Having acknowledged that one cannot add together,
at least in any sort of an algebraic manner, the various
costs and benefits, the types of equations that would be
used if one could do this will nevertheless be suggested
below for purposes of illustration. First, without any
controls (where C designates costs and B designates
benefits):
C Total = C Activity + 2 (impacts) S (components)
o p
C Effect^,
BT = BA + S £ BE
op
If it is found that the CT > BT, or that the net
benefits are not great enough, controls (co) may be
sought to mitigate the effects. This will change all the
determinations and calculations; for example, CA
will become CACO, or the cost of the activity as
modified by the control. Cco is the direct cost of the
control. This yields:
2 CE
O P
CO CO
+ CcoCT = C A + S
CO
CO)' CO
and similarly for BTCO. This could also be done for
many controls (co1; co2, . . . ) . One cannot simply
compare CTCO/BTCO with CT/BT to determine if a
control is warranted, for the same reason that one cannot
explicitly use such equations—the types of costs in one
may be very different from the other, so they are not
directly intercomparable. These have been elaborated to
demonstrate the interrelatedness suggested in Fig. 1
—not to prescribe a way of dealing with a problem that
somehow must be solved (because analyses must be
performed and decisions must be made). It also has to
be noted that the technical basis for using a cost/
benefit ratio versus a calculation of net benefits for the
purposes of impact evaluation is a subject of consider-
able controversy—see, for example, De Neufville &
Stafford (1971).
The analyst must have some explicit subjective
criteria on which to base his investigation of trade-offs
among activities, impacts, and any controls that might
be possible. These are, in fact, not very different from
those he has to use throughout the other steps of the
analysis. Reducing the list of environmental compo-
nents to be considered in the analysis is equivalent to
judging that any impact on them is 'acceptable', while
leaving components on the list suggests that, under
some circumstances, adverse impacts on them would
be 'unacceptable.' The same could be said for every
step. Thus, the analyst already has some sort of
'value framework' that will aid and will influence the
final step of determining the various trade-offs.
ADOPTING A 'VALUE FRAMEWORK'
This paper has shown that, at every stage of an
environmental impact analysis, subjective judgements
must be made. These are of necessity based on values,
feelings, beliefs, and prejudices, and are functions of
the personal, institutional, professional, and societal,
contexts of the analyst. The only way that 'decision-
makers', and the people whom they represent, can
prevent being overly influenced by the values that
must be introduced in the process of an analysis, is lo
insist that the value-judgements and their implications
be made explicit. To do this the analyst must be
aware of when he is making subjective judgements,
and of the nature of the 'value-framework' which he
uses.
It is impossible to develop such a framework with
the specificity needed to make detailed judgements,
and with the generality to be useful in very many
cases. In addition to the problems caused by the
fact that values vary with time and context, there is the
overriding political question of which group's articu-
lation of values and principles represent those of the
society. The analyst is subject to many pressures but
has very little unambiguous guidance.
Although this paper cannot present a useful and
operational value-framework, the author can suggest
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some of the most general types of environmentally-
related values and priorities that seem to be operating
in his own country (the United States). This exposi-
tion is not based on a scientific analysis but is given to
suggest how one might begin constructing a value-
framework that would provide the analyst with some
basis for proceeding with his work.
Environmental impact analysis, through the final
step of assessing trade-offs, requires some assumptions
about the way in which society views economic,
human health, environmental, social, and political,
costs and benefits. It is very difficult to operationalize
these concepts. The easiest and most straightforward
appears to be the 'economic' one, because it is, in
principle, quantitative—even though the uncertainties
involved in the analyses may overshadow this advan-
tage. 'Human health' is relatively straightforward
with respect to soundness of body in terms of mor-
bidity/mortality (though one may not be able to deter-
mine the figures), but it is much more difficult to
generate quantitative (or even convincing operational)
criteria for soundness of mind, and even harder for the
soul.
In theory it should be possible to decide on opera-
tional criteria for assessing 'environmental costs and
benefits' of an action if this refers to the 'natural'
environment, because it is generally believed that the
laws of Nature are orderly and can be determined.
However, even if they are indeed orderly, these laws of
Nature have, in general, not been determined, and one
must deal with very non-quantifiable issues—such as
the effects of changes in diversity, stability, and trophic
webs. This problem has already been seen in almost
every phase of analyzing impacts. Theorists disagree
over whether one can ever expect operational criteria
for 'social costs and benefits'. Individuals and com-
munities do not seem to act in orderly enough manners
for social scientists to have figured them out, or even
to determine if they will ever be able to do so. 'Poli-
tical costs and benefits' vary greatly with the individual
or groups involved, and political scientists are in
about the same state as other social scientists when it
comes to providing much rigorous insight into what
will or will not result in losses or increases in power (the
crux of political criteria) in any given situation.
Thus, as one looks to the natural and social sciences
for support, there is not much real guidance; despite
many studies, some very useful insights, and a few
helpful models, there is very little operational guidance
on how to establish general operational criteria. From
our past experience with environmental management
in the United States, we can perceive how the social and
political processes appear to be operating with respect
to these types of analyses. The following is the author's
modest attempt to illustrate how these perceptions can
be made explicit as the first step in developing a value-
framework. If controversy is raised over such ventures
into societal analysis, this is to be expected and can
indeed assist the analyst in the long run. The analyst
need not be absolutely correct in choosing his criteria
(in fact he could never be); but he must be explicit, so
that those who disagree with him can disregard the con-
clusions that are associated with his controversial
assumptions.
In the context of environmental concerns, the highest
priority in the United States seemed to be, until
relatively recently, 'economic'—as measured by growth
of the gross national product (GNP), industry,
employment, and the standard of living. In the past
couple of decades, 'human health' has emerged as a
close second in some cases (such as occupational
health), and has even surpassed it in others (such as
when carcinogenic compounds or activities are
involved). In general, however, human health, espe-
cially in areas outside of cancer (for example, from
asbestos) and massive deaths (for example, from
nuclear reactor accidents), is often given a second
priority to the economic criteria listed above. With
respect to soundness of mind and soul, society seems
only dimly aware that these are issues, and indeed
important costs, to be considered against economic
benefits. As many of the 'social costs and benefits' are
in this category, they likewise do not receive a great
deal of attention, though they are gaining ground.
It is hardly surprising that, with such complacency
about deteriorating individual and social health, there
should be even more complacency about the 'environ-
ment'. There are many supporters of the environment;
but there does not seem to be enough real understand-
ing on the part of the populace to support very strin-
gent controls on purely environmental grounds
(rather than on human health or economic grounds).
The highest priority in this area seems to be the group
of effects on components of the environment that
would directly affect human health (for example, by
disease or lack of food). A second, and in some cases
first, priority would be those effects that would cause
some economic loss (for example, loss of crops, timber,
income-producing lands, and so on). The third
priority would be to protect the environment for 'its
own sake' or 'for posterity'. This is usually a very low
priority—unless there is an unusual groundswell and
the 'political' reasons become paramount and require
it (for example, the imminent extinction of a popular
but not economically important species).
This general ordering of criteria on environmental
costs and benefits seems likely to remain for the
foreseeable future. However, there are a few things
that might change it—such as obtaining a better
understanding of the relationships between the
environment and what is considered as human health,
so that people can act more wisely in their own best
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interests by preventing or mitigating environmental
effects which would indirectly harm them or their
'quality of life'. Through gaining more knowledge and
providing public education, efforts can be made to
close the gap between the second and third priority, so
that the environment will not always be viewed
primarily as an economic resource but as having value
in itself and as a contributor to the health of the mind,
soul, and society. And, finally, through these new
insights society may ultimately be able to make trade-
offs between environment and economics that are
based on qualitative criteria as much as, or even more
than, on monetary values or their facsimiles.
'Political costs and benefits' are the final and often
determining assessments that must be made by the
decision-maker. In U. S. society, these have enormous
weight because the political arena is where all the
diverse values must finally be put in some order of
priority. It is important, however, to be sure that
'biopolitical' criteria are not used. According to
Caldwell (1968), these are the criteria which determine
that something which is politically necessary is biolo-
gically acceptable. This is not always so, and society's
protection against such irregularity is to be as explicit
about 'political' aspects as about other ones, so that
the latter will not always exert the overriding influence.
All of the criteria outlined here for determining 'costs
and benefits' must be used in deciding whether an
activity should proceed, whether an adverse effect is
acceptable, and whether modifications, alternatives, or
controls, are justified. But they are also used in all
those subjective judgements that have been referred to
so frequently in this paper. For 'rational' environmen-
tal management processes it is necessary to be as
explicit as possible about how society feels on these
criteria, and how it 'ought' to feel on the basis of the
best scientific information available. It is also very
important that society, and the decision-makers and
analysts who serve it, understand the nature of
environmental impact analysis and the judgements
that must be made in the process. This paper has been
devoted to furthering this latter objective.
SUMMARY
Analyses of environmental impacts, and descriptions
of methodologies for conducting them, have not always
been explicitly cognizant of the subjective value-
judgements that must be made in the process of collect-
ing, refining, assessing, and presenting, objective
scientific information. This paper has outlined the
types of objective and subjective judgements that are
made in each of the following major steps of the
analysis: identifying major activities; selecting environ-
mental components; selecting types of impacts; assess-
ing the possibilities and/or probabilities of occurrences;
determining the degree of the impacts; determining the
time-frame of impacts; designating impacts as positive,
neutral, or negative; and determining trade-offs
among activities and impacts.
The subjective judgements that must be made are
based on values, feelings, beliefs, and prejudices, and
are functions of the personal, institutional, profes-
sional, and societal, contexts of the analyst. If great
care is not taken in making these judgements, and in
making very explicit the value-framework used, the
effectiveness and credibility of the analyst may be
sharply reduced. There is also the danger that society
and its decision-makers will be presented with an
analysis having so many built-in biases that the
legitimate role of the decision-makers in assessing the
analysis and then making important value trade-offs
is seriously compromised. This paper has attempted to
make the nature of the process of analysis explicit with
respect to the introduction and treatment of values, so
that these problems can be understood and, it is hoped,
properly managed by both scientists and decision-
makers.
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The Real Crisis Behind the 'Food Crisis'
The world as we know it will probably be ruined before
the year 2000, and the reason for this will be its inhabitants'
failure to comprehend two facts. These facts are:
1. World food production cannot keep pace with the
galloping growth of population.
2. 'Family planning' will not and cannot, in the foreseeable
future, check this runaway growth.
The momentum towards tragedy is at this moment so great
that there is probably no way of halting it. The only hopeful
possibility is to reduce the dimensions of the coming disaster.
We are being misled by those who say there is a serious
food-shortage. This is not true; world food production this
decade is the greatest in history. The problem is that there
are too many people. The food shortage is simply evidence
of the problem. It makes no difference whatever how much
food the world produces, if it produces people faster than they
can be fed.
Some nations are now on the brink of famine, because
their populations have grown beyond the carrying capacity
of their lands. Population growth has pushed many of the
peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, onto lands
which are only marginally suitable for agriculture. No
amount of scientific wizardry or improved weather will
change this situation.
For a quarter of a century the United States has been
generous with its food surpluses, but these have now
vanished. This one country has given at least 80 thousand
million dollars' worth of food and development aid since
World War II. Now what is the result? Today, the develop-
ing world is less able to feed itself than it was before the
massive U.S. aid programme began. A generation ago, the
population of poor countries was increasing by 16 millions
a year; now it increases by 67 millions each year and the
imbalance grows worse and worse. Furthermore, our past
generosity has encouraged a do-nothing policy in the
governments of some developing nations. At the 1974
United Nations conferences in Bucharest and Rome, which
were concerned with population and food, respectively,
spokesmen for these developing nations incredibly asserted
that they had no population problem. They defended this
with two policy statements that:
1. The hungry nations have the right to produce as many
children as they please.
2. Others have the responsibility to feed them.
We believe that these statements are irresponsible and
indefensible. Any nation that asserts the right to produce
more babies must also assume the responsibility for taking
care of them.
Some people speak optimistically of progress within the
hungry nations, as evidenced by the modest acceptance of
family planning programmes in many countries. 'Family
planning will succeed', they tell us. But how is this possible?
Family planning advocates, to gain acceptance, insist that
parents everywhere may have as many children as they
desire. If the number of children wanted had always been
two (on the average), we would not now have a population
problem. The crisis exists because parents want more than
two children. In Moslem countries, for example, the desired
number of progeny per couple is 'as many as Allah will
send'. This turns out, on the average, to be seven!
The country which has spent the most money on family
planning over the longest period of time (India—24 years)
has accomplished virtually nothing. Its population in 1951
grew by 3.6 millions. Now it grows by 16.2 millions each
year. Mexico adopted family planning only three years ago
and the birth-rate there has risen abruptly—according to
Jose Campillo Sainz, Mexican Secretary of Industry and
Commerce, in a speech before the U.S.-Mexico Chamber
of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 2 December 1974.
Yet many people insist that it is the moral obligation of
the United States not only to continue but to increase her
aid—totally overlooking the fact that it is impossible, from
a practical standpoint. Eighty per cent of the world's grain
is not grown in the United States. All that we can sell or
give away amounts to only 6% of the world's production,
and less than three years' population increase alone would
consume this.
There can be no moral obligation to do the impossible. This
does not mean that we advocate 'triage'—the selection of
those nations which seem most likely to survive and the
concentration of our available food aid on them. Few if
any people can really advocate triage. The question would
only arise if we should reach the point where the world
population outruns food resources. This situation is now
being approached, with the world's present stores of grain
the lowest since records started to be kept after World
War II. If such a situation should actually come about,
some people would die—no matter what the disposition of
the inadequate food supply might be. In that event, some
hard decisions would have to be made.
At some point, people in the United States are going to
find that they cannot provide for the world any more than
they can police it. In summary, our position is this: The
sovereign right of each nation to control its own reproduc-
tion creates the reciprocal responsibility to care for its own
people. The U.S. can help and will do so, but only to the
limits of her available resources.
The belief that the crisis result from a 'shortage' of food
leads to disaster. Attempting to deal with this by producing
and distributing more food, while doing nothing about
population, is incubating disaster. For there are distinct
limits to what can be produced on this finite globe. We
must not permit our aid to underwrite the failure of some
nations to take care of their own situations. If only aid-
dependent nations could understand that there are limits to
North American food resources, there would be hope that
they would tackle their population problems in earnest. We
owe it to posterity—our own and that of the rest of the
world—to promote policies which lead to solutions
instead of catastrophe.
JUSTIN BLACKWELDER, President
The Environmental Fund
1302 Eighteenth Street, N. W.
Washington
D.C. 20036, U.S.A.
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